The Admissibility of Confessions in Evidence in Criminal Courts by Latimer, Edward Brandt
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 5 Issue 2 Article 9 
12-1952 
The Admissibility of Confessions in Evidence in Criminal Courts 
Edward Brandt Latimer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Latimer, Edward Brandt (1952) "The Admissibility of Confessions in Evidence in Criminal Courts," South 
Carolina Law Review: Vol. 5 : Iss. 2 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol5/iss2/9 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS IN EVIDENCE
IN CRIMINAL COURTS
By EDWARD BRANDT LATIMxR*
I. SOUTH CAROLINA CRIMINAL COURTS
Scope. In South Carolina a "confession", in a legal sense, is re-
stricted to an acknowledgment of guilt made by a person after an
offense has been committed, and it does not embrace a mere state-
ment or declaration of independent facts from which such guilt might
be inferred.' This same rule was recently given in State v. 10ller
which cited the same rule in State v. Pittinan.3 A confession includes
an acknowledgment of all of the essential elements of the crime
charged and is generally defined as an acknowledgment of guilt.
4
A confession may be made by conduct or by words, may be ex-
pressed or implied or may be oral or written. It may be said or
written in many forms. 5 A confession is either judicial or extra-
judicial. A judicial confession is one made in conformity to law
before a committing magistrate or in court in the course of legal
proceedings. An extrajudicial confession is one made by a party
elsewhere than before, a -magistrate or in court.0
History. In the early common law periods there were no restric-
tions at all upon the reception of confessions as evidence, but the
courts came to realize that confessions induced by force or threats
might be untrustworthy.7 All the safeguards thrown around con-
fessions by the law are to insure truth.8 The courts also wished to
keep involuntary confessions out of evidence in order to protect the
suspect from torture and self-incrimination.9 The rule developed
that a confession had to be voluntarily given. 10 The general rule, in
federal and state courts, finally came to be that the admissibility of
B. S College of Charleston, 1948; LL.B., University of South Carolina, 1951. Mem-
ber Rlichland County and South Carolina Bar Associations.
1. State v. Epes, 209 S. C. 246, 39 S. E. 2d 769 (1946).
2. State v. Miller, 211 S. C. 306, 45 S. E. 2d 23 (1947).
3. State v. Pittman, 137 S. C. 75, 134 S. E. 514 (1926).
4. People v. Wynecoop, 359 Il1. 124, 149 N. E. 276 (1935).
5. 22 C. J. S. 1422, CRIMINAL LAW, § 816.
6. 22 C. J. S. 1423, CRIMINAL LAW, § 816.
7. Wigmore, EvimDNcE, 3rd Ed., Vol. 3, § 816. See: 39 J. CRUM. LAw 743
(1949).
8. State v. Miller, supra. See: State v. Baker, 58 S. C. 111, 36 S. E. 501
(1900).
9. Brain v. U. S., 168 U. S. 532, 18 S. Ct. 183, 42 L. Ed. 568 (1897).
10. Brain v. U. S., supra.
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ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS
confessions depended upon whether they were voluntary or involun-
tary.11 This is ordinarily a question of fact.12 The South Carolina
Supreme Court held in State v. Harris'8 that a confession is not ad-
missible in evidence unless it is voluntary. This rule has been given
in almost every case that has come before the court concerning con-
fessions and was stated in the early case of State v. Kirby.
14
When the admission in evidence of a confession is regulated by
statute the confession will not be admitted except in strict accordance
with the statutory provisions. A South Carolina statute was ap-
proved on March 1, 195215 which states that unless a copy is furnished
to a person who gave a written statement the person who gave the
statement could not be questioned thereon. The Act provides that
"when any person employed by the state, or any political subdivision
thereof, takes a written statement from any person in any investiga-
tion, the person taking the statement shall give to the person making
the statement a copy thereof and shall obtain from him a signed re-
ceipt for the copy. No witness in any preliminary hearing or criminal
proceeding shall be examined or cross-examined concerning any such
written statement unless it is first shown that he was given a copy of
the statement at the time of its making and that before his examina-
tion or. cross-examination the witness was given a copy of the state-
ment and a reasonable time to read it. Unless all of the above pro-
visions are complied with, no such statement shall be admissible in
evidence in any case, nor shall any reference be made to it in the
trial of any case."
Determination of Voluntariness. The question as to the admissi-
bility of a confession is to be determined before its admission.' 6 The
determination of whether a confession shall be received is in the first
instance for the court.1 7 Where the evidence is susceptible of no
other conclusion than that a confession was involuntary, it is error
for the trial judge not to exclude it.18 The jury, however, is the
final arbiter of whether or not a confession is voluntary, 19 and the
state, seeking to introduce a confession, has the burden of proving
11. Wilson v. U. S., 162 U. S. 613, 16 S. CL 895, 40 L. Ed. 1090 (1896).
12. Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547, 62 S. Ct. 1139, 86 L. Ed. 1663 (1942).
13. State v. Harris, 212 S. C. 124,46 S. E. 2d 682 (1948); 338 U. S. 68,
69 S. Ct. 1354, 93 L. Ed. 1815 (1948).
14. State v. Kirby, 1 STRoB. 155 (S. C. 1846).
15. SOUTH CAROLINA AcT, Ratification No. 861, Approved "farch 1, 1952.
See: 4 S. C. I,. Q. 575 (1952).
16. State v. Moorer, 27 S. C. 22, 2 S. E. 621 (1887).
17. State v. Carson, 131 S. C. 42, 126 S. E. 757 (1925).
18. State v. Goodwin, 127 S. C. 107, 120 S. E. 496 (1923).
19. State v. Branham, 13 S. C. 389 (1880).
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that it was voluntary. 0 The corpus delicti -must be -proved aliunde"
prior to the prosecution offering in evidence the -alleged confession
of the defendant, 21 but the corpus delicti can be proved by circum-
stantial evidence.
22
Where the'court excludes the jury while hearing evidence on the
question of whether a confession. is. voluntary or not, the state, on
the jury being recalled, must, in introducing the confession, reintro-
duce the testimony presented to the judge, the jury being the final
judges of the voluntary character of the confession. 23 It is neces-
sary and proper to admit in evidence every part of a confession and
to then instruct the jury not to consider it against anyone except.
the person making it.24 A confession is evidence only against the
one making it.25 However, the admission of a confession of a co-
defendant and accessory which only incriminates the'defendant is not
reversible error unless it is objected to in time.2 6 The confession
of a party is the highest evidence.2 7 The decision of the judge and
the jury on the question of fact as to whether or not a confession is
voluntary will not be reviewed by the supreme court unless it is so
manifestly erroneous as to show an abuse of judicial discretion.28
The courts uniformly hold that a confession 'is not voluntary, as
n matter of law, if induced by force or threats, or by any direct or
implied promises.29 The rule requiring that a confession be volun-
tarily made before it is competent was not dstablished to protect'
guilty persons against a truthful confession but to guard the innocent"
against a false confession made under duress, promise of reward or
other inducement. A confession is admissible in a trial in the criminal
court where it is shown that the confession was free and voluntary,
was not obtained by coercion or hope, of rewardOO or extorted by.
20. State v. Rogers, 99 S. C. 504, 83 S. I. 97" (1914). *See: State v. Hester,
137 S. C. 145, 134 S. E. 885 (1926). State v. Edwards, 173 S. C. 161, 175 S. E.
277 (1934). State v. Brown, 103 S. C. 437, 88 S. E. 21 (1916).
21. State v. Miller, supra. See: State v. Blocker, 205 S. C. 303, 31 S. E.
2d 908 (1944).
22. Bolland v. U. S., 238 F. 529, 151 CCA 465 (1916).
23. State v. Rogers, supra.
24. State v. Jeffords, 121 S. C. 443, 114 S. E. 415 (1922).
25. State v. Workman, 15 S. C. 540 (1881). See: State v. Dodson, 16 S. C.
453 (1882).
26. State v. Brown, 212 S. C. 237, 47 S. E. 2d 521 (1948) ; Cert. de,. 335
U. S. 834, 69 S. Ct. 22, 93 L. Ed. 386.
27. Corp. of Columbia v. Harrison, 2 Miu. CoNsT. 213 (S. C. 1818).
28. State v. Brown, supra (1948). See: State v. Judge, 208 S. C. 497, 38
S. E. 2d 715 (1946).
29. 22 C. J. S. 1424, Confessions, § 817.
30. Op. ATTY. GnN. 255 (1936-1937).
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threats and violence.8 ' A confession or disclosure made under any
promise or encouragement of any hope or favor 2 or gotten by per-
suasion and hope of immunity is inadmissible. 3 A confession may, in
certain instances, be admitted under judicial compulsion. The testi-
,mony given at a coroner's inquest, at a time when the defendant was
not charged with the crime, is admissible, 4 a confession made at a pre-
liminary examination before a trial justice is adiissible35 and a
statement under oath of an ordinary witness is admissible against
him. 86
Many different methods of taking confessions-may be used, and,
if the confession is free and voluitary, it is admissible in evidence.
A confession is not rendered involuntary merely because a dicta-
phone or detectaphone was used.8 7 Truth serums are narcotic drugs
which induce unconsciousness and are about the same as hypnosis,
consequently, such cotifessions are inadmissible because they are in-
voluntary. The lie detector is a scientific instrument to record physio-
logical phenomena.8 Courts almost uniformly reject the results of
lie detectors, however, voluntary confessions obtained from an ac-
cused have been held not to have been rendered inadmissible by rea-
son of the fact that a lie detector was employed, it appearing that the
record of the-lie detector was not offered in evidence.8 9 People v.
Sims40 states that a person cannot be made to take a lie detector
test, and when a person is forced to take a lie detector test, with
other coercive force present, the confession is inadmissible.
41
In determining whether a confession is voluntary, the age, situa-
tion and character of the accused, 42 and the circumstances under which
the confession was made,43 should be taken into consideration. 4 4 A
defendant's confession is not excluded from evidence as not volun-
31. State v. Bing, 115 S. C. 506, 106 S. E. 573 (1921). See: State v. John-
son, 137 S. C. 7, 133 S. E. 823 (1926). State v. Middleton, 69 S. C. 72, 48 S. E.
35 (1904).
32. State v. Kirby. supra.
33. State v. Motley, 7 RicH. 327 (S. C. 1854). See: State v. Vaigneur, 5
RIcH. 391 (S. C. 1852).
34. State v. Senn, 32 S. C. 392, 11 S. E. 292 (1889).
35. State v. Branham; supra.
36. State v. Vaigneur, supra.
37. State v. Hester, supra.
38. 23 A. L. R. 2d 1306; See: 26 BosToN U. L. REv. 264.
39. Commonwealth v. Hipple, 333 Pa. 33, 3 A.:2d.353 (1939). See: Com-
mohwealth v. Jones, -341 Pa. 541, 19 A. 2d 389 (1941). In'Re Lie.Detector, 2
S. C. L. Q. 266 (1950).
40. People v. Sims, 395 Ill. 69, 69 N..E. 2d 336 (1946).
41. Bruner v. People, 113 Colo. 194, 156 P. 2d 111 (1945).
42. State v. Kirby, supra. . -
43. State v. Baker, stpra.
44. State v. Judge, supra. .. :
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tary merely because the defendant was under arrest.45 Such a con-
fession made to a person in authority, although admitted under
more stringent rules than when made to private persons, is admis-
sible if free and voluntary.46  In State v. Brown47 the court held
that a confession was not required to be excluded merely because
it was made while the defendant was in illegal custody before any
warrant was issued for the defendant's arrest or merely because the
defendant was placed in jail in a county other than the county where
the crime was committed, in violation of a South Carolina statute.
A confession is admissible although it is elicited by questions, whether
put to the defendant by a magistrate, officer or private person, and
the form of the question is immaterial. 48 A confession is free and
voluntary and admissible even though the manner of the officer was
rude49 and even though the defendant was cautioned to tell the truth.50
A confession made under representations of the infamy which would
attend the concealment of knowledge and made under great excite-
ment, but without threats, promises or concealment of the conse-
quences is admissible. 51
To render a confession admissible in evidence it is not necessary
that the prisoner should be forewarned of the effect his confession
may have,52 nor does the defendant have to be warned that he does
not have to answer questions.5 3 In State v. Miller5 4 it was held that
a confession is voluntary even though at the time made the defendant
was under arrest, had not been formally charged with a crime, had
not been informed that he was not compelled to incriminate himself
and was not offered benefit of counsel. Confessions have been ex-
cluded in certain cases where the court has ruled that there was a
coercive atmosphere. The taking of a confession from a person after
he had been held in jail several days during which time he was ques-
tioned excessively, was not informed of his rights, had no prelimi-
nary hearing and was denied benefit of counsel, family and friends,
was a denial of due process of law under the 14th amendment to
45. State v. Brown, supra. See: State v. Henderson, 74 S. C. 477, 55 S. R.
117 (1906).
46. State v. Dodson, 14 S. C. 628 (1881). See: State v. Brown, supra, State
v. Judge, supra.
47. State v. Brown, supra.
48. State v. Kirby, 1 STROB. 378 (1847). See: 1 GrtEVXL.AF EVID., § 239.
49. State v. Branham, supra.
50. State v. Swygert, 130 S. C. 91, 124 S. E. 636 (1924).
51. State v. Crank, 2 BAILrY 66, 23 Am. Dec. 117 (S. C. 1831).
52. State v. Workman, supra.
53. State v. Simmons, 112 S. C. 451, 100 S. E. 149 (1919)..
54. State v. Miller, .supra.
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the United States Constitution and on a subsequent prosecution for
murder the confession was held to be inadmissible.
55
In State v. Motley56 it was held that so much of a confession as
led to the discovery of a material fact may be given in evidence, al-
though the confession is involuntary. The later case of State v.
Middleton5 7 held that where a confession is involuntary it is inadmis-
sible, but evidence disclosed by such defendant is admissible and it
may be stated that the evidence was found under the defendant's
guidance. The United States Supreme Court in State v. HarrisS8
held that the admission in evidence of an involuntary confession is
a denial of due process of the law under the 14th amendment of the
Federal constitution and in a subsequent prosecution the confession
is inadmissible. The same court held in the Ashcraft cases59 that
the admission on a second trial of evidence concerning an involuntary
confession was a violation of due process of law under the 14th
amendment of the Federal constitution because it had the same weight
upon the jury as the involuntary confession.
Admissions. Admissions are merely acknowledgments of one or
more facts and fall short of an acknowledgmerit of guilt.60 Admis-
sions were not originally subject to the confession rule, however,
some courts subjected them to the confession rule by holding that
all incriminating evidence was subject to the same test as a confes-
sion.61 In State v. PittuMa62 the court held that in South Carolina
confessions are subject to the rule of voluntariness or involuntariness,
whereas admissions are not subject to this rule and are admitted
even though they are gotten involuntarily.
II. Dui PRocEss CLAusE, 14TH AxENDMENT OV THE
UNIT D STATES CONSTITUTION
The United States Supreme Court does not have supervisory
powers over state criminal proceedings except to the extent of the
due process of law clause of the 14th amendment of the United
States Constitution which states: "No state shall . . . deprive any
55. State v. Harris, supra.
56. State v. Motley, supra. See: State v.Vaigneur, sutpra.
57. State v. Middleton, supra.
58. State v. Harris, supra.
59. State v. Ashcraft, 322 U. S. 143, 64 S. Ct. 921, 88 L. Ed. 1192 (1944).
State v. Ashcraft, 327 U. S. 274, 66 S. Ct. 544, 90 L. Ed. 667 (1945).
60. Wigmore, EViDmCE, 3rd Ed., Vol. III, § 821.
61. Luette v. State, 152 Fla. 495, 12 So. 2d 168 (1943).
62. State v. Pittman, supra.
6
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person of life, liberty qr property without due process of law".683
The 14th amendment does not incorporate, as such, the specific
guaranties found in the other amendments; however, it was held in
State v. "Garcia64 that the denial by 'a state court of rights -and privi-
leges specifically embodied in the amendments, may, in certain cir-
cumstances or in connection with other elements, operate, in a given
case, to deprive the litigant of due process of law in violation of the
14th amendment.65 A confession which is not voluntary is not ad-
missible in evidence under the 5th amendment to the Federal consti-
tution, declaring that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case
to be a witness against himself.6 6 The United States Supreme Court
now holds that no involuntary confession, whether obtained by force,
threats, direct or implied promises, or by psychological coercion, can
be admitted in a federal or state trial. The admission in evidence bf
an involuntary confession in a state criminal court is a violation of
the 14th amendment of the Federal constitution and the admission
on a second trial, after the reversal of a prior conviction upon the
ground that the confession was involuntary, of oral testimony con-
cerning the same facts stated in the involuntary confession consti-
tutes a denial of due process of law to the same extent as the in-
voluntary confession.
6 7
Voluntary Ride. Generally, a confession is admissible if it is free
and voluntary,6 8 and without compulsion or inducement.6 9 It must
not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by
any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion
of any improper influences.7 0 It has been held that prolonged and
relentless questioning is coercion. 71 In certain cases the question-
ing was coupled with other acts of coercion. In Malinski v. N. Y. 72
the defendant was stripped. In Haley v. Ohio73 the defendant was
a youth. In the three previous cases and in Watts v'. Ind., Turner
v. Pa. and Harris v. S. C.74 the United States Supreme Court held
that there was a "coercive atmosphere".
63. Buchalter v. N. Y., 319 U. S. 427 (1943).
* 64. State v. Garcia, 47 N. M. 319142 P. 2d 552 (1943).
65. 149 A. L. R. 1403.
66. Brain v. U. S., suptra.
67. Ashcraft v. Tenn., supra (1944). Ashcraft v. Tenn., supra (1945).
68. 20 Am. JuR., EvID., 482.
69. Wilson v. U. S., supra..
70. Brain v. U. S., supra.
71. Ashcraft v. Tenn., supra (1944). Ashcraft v. Tenn., supra (1945).
72. Malinski .v. N. Y., 324 U. S. .401, 65 S. Ct. 781, 89 L. Ed. 1029 (1945).
73. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 68 S. Ct. 302, 92 L. Ed. 224 (1947).
74. Watts v. Ind., 338 U. S. 49, 69 S. Ct. 1347, 93 L. Ed. 1801 .,(1949).
Turner v. Pa., 338 U. S. 6a 69 S..Ct. 1352, 93 L. Ed. 1810 (1949:). State v.
Harris, supra. . . .
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Whether the suspect has a right to counsel depends upon the per-
tinent constitutional provisions, statutes and judicial decisions of the
particular jurisdiction. In the federal courts the 6th amendment to
-the federal constitution, providing inter alia that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have assistance of
,counsel for his defense, has been construed as granting to an accused
unable to procure the services of an attorney the right to have the
court appoint competent and qualified counsel to assist him, and is
effective whether convicted by confession or by jury. 5 The 14th
amendment, however, does not incorporate, as such, the specific
guaranties found in the 6th amendment.
In many state courts, subject to the limitations imposed upon the
particular circumstances by the due process clause of the state and
federal constitutions, the indigent accused's right to appointment
'of counsel depends upon his request therefor and also upon the
nature of the crime involv'ed.7 6 When the defendant is denied coun-
sel this fact will be considered by the United States Supreme Court
in determining whether or not the confession is voluntary.77
The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that it is not error
to admit in evidence a confession of the prisoner, over the objec-
tion that before making the alleged confession the prisoner had
been refused an opportunity to communicate with counsel, where
the confession was voluntary.7 8 However, the jury should be told
that they could take this into consideration to determine if the con-
fession was voluntary or involuntary79 because the jury is the final
arbiter of whether or not a confession is voluntary.80 However,
other courts have held that the statutes or constitutions needed broad
interpretation of the right to counsel,8 ' upholding the old maxim:
"The letter killeth and disregardeth the conclusion, while the spirit
giveth life".
Custody. The mere fact that the accused is in custody does not
necessarily make a confession involuntary.82 The federal courts
and most state courts determine the admissibility of a confession
entirely upon whether or not it is voluntary, even though it is ob-
75. Evans v. Rives, 126 F. 2d 633 (1942).
76. 3 A. L. R. 2d 1003. See: 4 S. C. L. Q. 595 (1952).
77. -Stale v. Harris, supra.
78. State v. Pittman, sapra.
79. State v. Robinson, 263 Mo. 318, 172-S. W. 598 (1915).
80. State v. Branham, supra.
81. Welk v. State, 99 TEX. CRIm. REP. 235,,265 S. W. 914 (1924).
82. Wilson v. U. S., supra.
8
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tained illegally. 83 The illegality has been held relevant only in sub-
sequent civil actions against the misfeasant officials.8 4
Exercising its supervisory power over the federal courts, the
United States Supreme Court in the case of McNabb v. U. S.8 5
held that a confession obtained while the accused was in illegal
custody was inadmissible as a matter of law, whether the confession
was voluntary or involuntary, and in Anderson v. U. S.86 the supreme
court held that a confession obtained by state officers in violation
of a state statute requiring that the accused be promptly arraigned
was inadmissible in federal courts as evidence.87 The McNabb rule
was a departure from the standard of voluntariness. The court said
that a violation of the prompt arraignment statutes tainted the con-
fession secured during illegal detention so as to make its admission
reversible per se. However, the case was not decided as a violation
of the due process clause of the 5th amendment of the United States
constitution. The doctrine applied only to federal courts and turned
upon whether or not the accused was promptly arraigned, which was
derived from Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure by authority of the United States statute which states: "...
an officer making an arrest . . . shall without unnecessary delay
take the person arrested before the nearest available committing
magistrate".
The state courts, rejecting the McNabb rule, continued to follow
the rule that the admission of confessions was determined by their
voluntariness or involuntariness.8 8 The majority of state courts held
that mere delay in arraignment did not vitiate a confession per se
even when the delay preceded the confession. Even in federal courts
it still was not clear whether illegal detention of itself barred a
confession. Some federal courts wrote a "Rule of Reason" into
the rule and said that the McNabb rule operated only to exclude
a confession where the accused had not been promptly taken before
a committing magistrate. 89 Others held that the McNabb rule oper-
ated only where the detention was illegal and where the confession
was produced by psychological coercion. 90  Other courts held that
83. See: 19 A. L. R. 2d 1335; 23 A. L. R. 2d 919.
84. See: 73 YALE L. J. 758 (1949).
85. McNabb v. U. S., 318 U. S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943).
86. Anderson v. U. S., 318 U. S. 350, 63 S. Ct. 599, 87 L. Ed. 829 (1943).
87. See: 23 TuuxiN L. R. 577 (1949). 37 Gto. L. J. 609 (1949).
88. State v. Folkes, 174 Ore. 568, 150 P. 2d 17 (1944).
89. Gros v. U. S., 136 F. 2d 878, (CCA 9th 1943).
90. RuM v. U. S., 148 F. 2d 173, (CCA 10th 1945).
9
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any type of illegal detention of the suspect precluded the admissi-
bility of a confession.91
In 1944 the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Mitchell
v. U. S.,92 began the process of setting definitive boundaries to the
McNabb rule. The court rejected the retroactive illegality test by
holding that spontaneous confessions were not inadmissible in evi-
dence because of subsequent illegal detention and said that inexcus-
able detention and the successful extraction of a confession by con-
tinued questioning for many hours under psychological pressure
were the decisive features in the McNabb case. 93 In Upshaw v.
U. S.94 the supreme court, by a 5 to 4 decision, affirmed the McNabb
rule but did little to clear up the misunderstanding. The majority
held that a delay in arraignment contrary to express statutory pro-
vision rendered a confession inadmissible as a matter of law. Four
justices, dissenting, wanted the Mitchell rule extended and said that
psychological pressure was the rule of the McNabb case and not the
bare fact of illegal delay in arraignment.
In Carignan v. U. S.9 5 the McNabb rule, as defined by the Upshaw
case, was upheld; however, in Haines v. U. S.96 the court modified
the McNabb rule. The court held that the brief delay in arraign-
ment was not resorted to for the purpose of getting a confession. The
court referred to the Carignan case and said that in that instance
the defendant could have been arraigned more promptly. Where it
also appeared that coercive measures were used to obtain confes-
sions, it has been held that the confessions were inadmissible under
the McNabb rule.
97
Most state courts have refused to apply the McNabb rule, saying
that it did not apply to state courts. In State v. Bunk 8 the court
held that a confession was not ipso facto inadmissible by reason of
the fact that the defendant had not been arraigned without unneces-
sary delay as provided by statute, but had been detained one to two
days without a hearing prior to his confession. In refusing to apply
the McNabb rule as interpreted by the Upshaw case the court pointed
91. Johnson v. U. S., 333 U. S. 10 (1948).
92. Mitchell v. U. S., 322 U. S. 65, 64 S. Ct. 896, 88 L. Ed. 1140 (1944).
93. See: 62 HARvARD L. R. 696 (1949).
94. Upshaw v. U. S., 335 U. S. 410, 69 S. Ct. 170, 93 L. Ed. 100 (1948).
95. Carignan v. U. S., 185 F. 2d 954, (CA 9th, Alaska, 1950) ; Cer. Gr. 341
U. S. 934, 71 S. Ct. 853, 95 L. Ed. 1363.
96. Haines v. U. S., 188 F. 2d 546, (CA 9th, Cal. 1951).
97. Anderson v. U. S., supra. Gros v. U. S., supra. Smith v. U. S., 187
F. 2d 192 (1950) ; cert. den. 341 U. S. 927, 71 S. Ct. 792, 95 L. Ed. 1358.
98. State v. Bunk, 4 N. J. 461, 73 A. 2d 249 (1950) ; 19 A. L. R. 2d 1316;
cert. den. 340 U. S. 839, 71 S. Ct. 25, 95 L. Ed. 615. State v. Brown, supra.
10
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out that the aforesaid decisions had involved the interpretation and
application of a federal statute rather than a state statute or rule and
that it would continue to apply the voluntariness test in determining-
the admissibility of confessions. In U. S. ex rel Mayo v. Burke99 the
court held that the McNabb rule was not based on constitutional
grounds and that the rule in the state courts remained that a con-
fession is admissible in evidence if voluntarily made. -Confessions
have been ruled inadmissible in a number of cases where a delay in
arraignment has been only one of several factors which combined
to create a coercive atmosphere -which most of the courts have found
to be violative of the due process clause of the 14th amendment of
the federal constitution. 10 0
Summary. The McNabb rule is sound and should be extended
to protect the individual from illegally obtained confessions and
illegally obtained evidence in violation of his right of due process
of law under the 14th amendment of the United States Constitution.
It has been suggested that the enactment of a uniform arrest act
would provide a solution, in permitting necessary inquiry and ques-
tioning before commitment, under strict court supervision.' 0 '
Mr. justice Holmes first expressed the rule in Ohnstead v. U. S.102
when he said that we must make a choice between two conflicting
desires: First, that all available evidence is to be used in the detec-
tion of criminals, and second, that the government should not itself
foster and pay for other crimes in order to secure evidence. Such
evidence should be inadmissible because "it is far less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the government should' play an
ignoble part". The McNabb rule establishes definite judicial safe-
guards for the rights of the individual though in no way hamper-
ing police protection for organized society against the unlawful acts
of individuals.
99. U. S. ex rel Mayo v. Burke, DC Pa., 93 F. Supp. 490; affr. CA 3d, -185
F. 2d 405 (1950) ; cert.- den. 341 U. S. 922, 71 S. Ct. 739, 95 L. Ed. 1355.
100. Ashcraft v. Tenn., supra (1944). Ashcraft v. Tenn., &upra (1945).
Malinski v. N. Y., stupra. Haley' v. Ohio, 'supra. Watts v. Ind., -ripra.; Turner
v. Pa., supra. State v. Harris, supra. Johnson v. Pa., 340 U. S. 881, 71 S. Ct.
191, 95 L. Ed. 640'(1950).
101. Warner, The Unifoh)n Act, 28 VA. L. R. 315 '(1942).
102. Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U. S. 438 (1928).
11
Latimer: The Admissibility of Confessions in Evidence in Criminal Courts
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
